Discriminatory Intent Necessary to Establish Violation of Fair Housing Act (Boyd v. Lefrak Organization) by Oster, Jonathan
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 50 
Number 2 Volume 50, Winter 1975, Number 2 Article 15 
August 2012 
Discriminatory Intent Necessary to Establish Violation of Fair 
Housing Act (Boyd v. Lefrak Organization) 
Jonathan Oster 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Oster, Jonathan (1975) "Discriminatory Intent Necessary to Establish Violation of Fair Housing Act (Boyd 
v. Lefrak Organization)," St. John's Law Review: Vol. 50 : No. 2 , Article 15. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol50/iss2/15 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
POVERTY LAW
DISCRIMINATORY INTENT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH VIOLATION
OF FAIR HOUSING ACT
Boyd v. Lefrak Organization
In an effort to eliminate discrimination in public and private
housing Congress has enacted extensive remedial legislation.' The
Civil Rights Act of 1866 guarantees to all citizens an equal right "to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." 2 Similarly, the Fair Housing Act of 1968 provides that it
is unlawful for any individual "to refuse to sell or rent . . . a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin."'3 In cases where a landlord has established
minimum financial criteria to determine a lessee's suitability, it has
been alleged that such requirements constitute prohibited dis-
crimination. In Boyd v. Lefrak Organization4 the Second Circuit held
that absent a racially discriminatory intent, the use of economic
criteria by private lessors is not prohibited by these Acts despite the
fact that the effect of such use is to exclude a disproportionate
number of minorities from a lessor's apartment buildings.
At the time the action was commenced, 5 defendant Lefrak
'See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970); Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601 el seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
2 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 is based upon the thirteenth
amendment, which bans slavery within the United States and applies to both private as well
as governmental action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968), held that the Act bars all racial discrimination in private and public
real property transactions.
3 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970), as antended, (Supp. IV, 1974). The effectiveness of the Fair
Housing Act in carrying out its intended policy "to provide, within constitutional limitations,
for fair housing throughout the United States," 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970), is illustrated by a
number of cases in which violations of § 3604(a) were established. For example, in Seaton v.
Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974), a real estate agent, who had initially refused to
negotiate the sale of a house to a black couple and was discouraging and uncooperative when
he finally agreed to show them the house, was held to have violated § 3604(a). In Johnson v.
Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), a violation was also
established where the defendant refused to show listings to a black couple while the same
listings were continually being shown to white buyers. Similarly, in United States v. Pelzer
Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974), a realtor who
actively discouraged blacks from buying in a white community, but offered to build
elsewhere, was held to be in violation of § 3604(a). Finally, in Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478
F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973), the failure of a landlord to sign a rental agreement upon learning
that the prospective tenants were black was held to be a violation of the section.
4509 F.2d I110 (2d Cir.), eert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 197 (1975).
Even before plaintiff Boyd was denied an apartment, the Attorney General of the
United States had commenced an action against the defendant pursuant to § 3613 of the
Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). This action was maintained to prevent Lefrak
from continuing an alleged "pattern and practice of resistance" to the Fair Housing Act.
Under § 3613:
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operated 119 buildings within New York City.6 As a prerequisite to
obtaining an apartment, each applicant had to meet established
economic criteria. Under defendants' standards, an applicant was
ineligible unless he and/or his spouse had a weekly net income
equal to at least 90 percent of the monthly rent (the 90 percent
rule). Alternatively, an applicant could qualify by obtaining a
cosigner to the lease whose weekly net income was equal to or
greater than 110 percent of the monthly rent.7 Plaintiff Boyd, a
black welfare recipient, attempted to rent an apartment in July
1971, but her application was refused allegedly because no apart-
ments were available at that time.' One year later, coplaintiff
Stoney, also a black welfare recipient, attempted to rent an apart-
ment, but was rejected because she could neither satisfy the 90
percent rule nor obtain a guarantor with the requisite weekly
income."
Whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or
group of persons is engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance to the full
enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter, or that any group of
persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter and such
denial raises an issue of general public importance, he may bring a civil action in
any appropriate United States district court ...requesting such preventive relief
... as he deems necessary to insure the full enjoyment of the rights granted by this
subchapter.
Consequently, Ms. Boyd moved to intervene in the Government's pending action. The
motion was denied, but the court directed that the application for intervention be treated as
a commencement of a separate action. 509 F.2d at 1112.
The Government's suit ended without an adjudication on the merits by a consent decree
whereby defendants agreed to comply with the Fair Housing Act, to maintain records of
applicants indicating their race, and to utilize economic criteria established by the Govern-
ment. The criteria developed by the Government included the 90% rule. See note 7 and
accompanying text infra. United States v. Life Realty, Inc., Civil No. 70-964 (E.D.N.Y., Jan.
28, 1971). In 1973, on defendants' motion the court dissolved the decree with prejudice,
with no objection voiced by the Government. 509 F.2d at 1112.
6 509 F.2d at 1111. The rentals for Lefrak's apartments ranged from $140 to $400 per
month. Id.
7 Id. Net income is determined by deducting all taxes, fixed obligations, and debts from
an applicant's gross income. Id. n.1. The industrywide standard, applied by landlords
throughout New York City, requires that the amount paid for rent not exceed 25% of the
applicant's gross income. Telephone interview with Edward Brodsky, attorney for defen-
dants-appellants, Feb. 10, 1976. It is interesting to note that this is the same formula utilized
tinder federal statutes to determine the economic qualifications of tenants in federally
subsidized low-rent housing. See Brief for Appellants at 9, Boyd v. Lefrak Org., 509 F.2d
1110 (2d Cir. 1975), citing 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l(f) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974) and 42
U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). Expert testimony for the defendants,
admitted as correct by plaintiffs' witnesses, revealed, through mathematical conversion, that
Lefrak's economic standard, when applied to welfare recipients, was equivalent to an allot-
ment of 25.65% of their income for rent. As applied to taxpayers, on the other hand, the
economic criterion was approximately 22% of their gross weekly salary. Thus, Lefrak's
financial requirements are roughly equivalent to the industrywide standard. Brief for Appel-
lants at 9-10.
' 509 F.2d at 1112 n.4. Ms. Boyd claimed that she was denied the apartment because she
was a welfare recipient. The Second Circuit, however, found it unnecessary to resolve this
issue since it was not raised on appeal. Id.
9 1d. at 1112.
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1974 TERM
Plaintiffs commenced a class action against the Lefrak Organi-
zation and its rental office, Life Realty, Inc., alleging violations of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fair Housing Act.10 In New
York City, the plaintiffs pointed out, minority groups constitute the
majority of public assistance recipients. Since the 90 percent rule
would exclude all but a small proportion of welfare recipients,
plaintiffs reasoned that the defendants' economic standard was
racially discriminatory and in violation of the two Acts." The
district court, agreeing that Lefrak's actions amounted to prohib-
ited discrimination, enjoined the defendant from further applica-
tion of its minimum economic requirements.1 2
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, 13 with Judge Hays
speaking for a divided court.1 4 Concerning itself with "whether or
not the financial criteria applied by defendants are violative of the
[Acts]," 5 the majority viewed the plaintiffs' argument as premised
upon the contention that welfare recipiency must be regarded as
the "functional equivalent" of race. Based on the Supreme Court's
decision in James v. Valtierra, 6 the court refused to adopt this
equation.
Acknowledging that welfare recipients have less of an oppor-
tunity to rent Lefrak apartments than do those not requiring public
assistance, the majority pointed out that the Fair Housing Act does
not require a lessor to rent to any prospective tenant. He may
refuse any applicant he wishes providing he does not discriminate
on one of the statutorily condemned bases and may certainly seek
") 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970); 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 etseq. (1970),asamnended, (Supp. IV, 1974).
Under both Acts, any citizen may commence a civil action in federal court without regard to
the amount in controversy. Section 3612(c) of the Fair Housing Act empowers the court to
grant as it deems appropriate injunctive relief as well as actual and punitive damages
amounting to as much as $1,000. See, e.g., Steele v. Title Realty Co., 478 F.2d 380 (10th Cir.
1973), where the court awarded compensatory damages and attorneys' fees, but reversed the
granting of injunctive relief as inappropriate.
1 509 F.2d at 1112. Plaintiffs also contended that the economic criteria established by
Lefrak were inappropriate for welfare recipients since increased shelter allowances may be
granted by the Department of Social Services, see N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 131-a (McKinney
Supp. 1975), when the recipient receives assurances from the landlord that he will rent the
apartment. 509 F.2d at 1114. The court, however, rejected this contention for two reasons:
First, a private landlord may use any criteria he desires in determining eligibility so long as
no discriminatory purpose is shown; and second, a landlord's choice of tenants is not
restricted by any obligation to a "special class of low income applicants." Id.
12 A nonjury trial was held in the Eastern District of New York before the Honorable
Tom C. Clark, Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, retired, sitting by
designation. See 509 F.2d at 1111-12.
"Ild. at 1115.
14 The majority consisted of Judges Hays and Anderson. Judge Mansfield authored a
dissenting opinion.
15 509 F.2d at 1112 n.4.
Ir 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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assurances that the lessee will be able to pay the rent.17 So long as
this is the purpose of defendants' economic requirements they are
proper. The mere fact that the application of the standards dis-
qualifies a higher percentage of minority groups, according to the
court, proves only that minorities tend to be poorer than the
general population.1 8 Thus, the court held that absent a showing
that defendants' motivation is racial rather than economic, there is
no violation of either the Fair Housing19 or Civil Rights Acts.2 °
Judge Mansfield, dissenting, rejected the majority's interpreta-
tion that direct evidence of a racially discriminatory motive is
necessary. He maintained that
where a facially neutral practice has a serious and substantial de
facto discriminatory impact, it prima facie violates a statutory
prohibition against racial discrimination unless the alleged vio-
lator can show that the practice is necessary for non-racial rea-
sons.
2 1
Judge Mansfield, relying on principles applied to analogous civil
rights legislation, looked primarily to the "business necessity" test
formulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 22 There, the Supreme Court
addressed the issue of whether an employer's use of standardized
17 509 F.2d at 1114, quoting Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir.
1972). In Male, the court held that although a landlord may not arbitrarily refuse rentals to
welfare recipients without permitting the recipients the opportunity to demonstrate their
ability to pay - especially since increased shelter allowances were readily obtainable - he
may seek assurances that a prospective tenant will be able to maintain his obligation. 469
F.2d at 622. Although Male involved a fourteenth amendment equal protection violation,
there is no reason to conclude that the principle that a landlord may seek assurances should
not be equally applicable to private lessors.
If, absent a tenant's ability to pay, there is no affirmative obligation imposed on the state
to provide apartments, no obligation should be imposed upon a private landlord. Con-
sequently, the Boyd court stated: "[W]e will not impose an affirmative duty on the private
landlord to accept low income tenants absent evidence that his motivation is racial rather
than economic in origin." 509 F.2d at 1113.
18 509 F.2d at 1113. See also Goodwin v. Wyman, 330 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
aff'd per curiom, 406 U.S. 964 (1972) (minorities, comprising greater proportion of welfare
recipients, usually occupy lower income levels).
19 509 F.2d at 1113.20 Id. at 1115, citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 421 (1968), Madison v.
Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114, 116-17 (4th Cir. 1974), and Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive
Cooperative Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1056 (7th Cir. 1972). Although the court citesJones for
support, it is debatable whether the decision therein actually aids the majority's position.
There, the Supreme Court said that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 "must encompass every
racially motivated refusal to sell or rent .... " 392 U.S. at 421-22. The issue in Jones was
whether the Act applied to private as well as governmental discrimination, not the require-
ment of discriminatory intent as an essential element of a violation. The fact that the Act
applies to all acts of racial discrimination in housing does not necessarily mean that it does
not encompass more. Cf. Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 330 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974); Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826-29 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
21 509 F.2d at 1115 (Mansfield, J., dissenting), citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971).
22 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
SECOND CIRCUIT NOTE, 1974 TERM
ability and intelligence tests was in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196423 where such testing had the effect of exclud-
ing a disproportionate number of blacks from employment and job
promotions. The Court held that under such circumstances the use
of testing procedures must have a "manifest relationship to the
employment in question. ' 24 Upon a showing that the effect of the
tests is to exclude racial minorities, the burden shifts to the defen-
dant to demonstrate that the tests are related to job performance.2 5
The Court explicitly noted that "good intent or absence of dis-
criminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or
testing mechanisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minor-
ity groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability. '26
Espousing a "generous construction" of the Fair Housing
Act,27 the dissent sought to replace the majority's subjective intent
test with the easier and more efficacious approach of looking at the
objective results of the lessor's standards. Then, if a discriminatory
effect were shown, the lessor, like an employer, would be put to the
burden of demonstrating a nonracial justification. Judge Mansfield
also criticized the majority's reliance on James v. Valtierra, 28 contend-
ing that sinceJamnes involved an equal protection claim, it is inappo-
23 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e) et seq. (1970), as amended, (Supp. IV, 1974). The general purpose
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as stated by Congress, is
to eliminate, through the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures,
discrimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin....
... [A]II persons within the jurisdiction of the United States have a right to the
opportunity tor employment without discrimination on account of race, color,
religion, or national origin. It is also declared to be the national policy to protect the
right of persons to be free from such discrimination.
H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1963).
24 401 U.S. at 432. The defendants in Griggs contended that when private employers
determine that educational and aptitude tests are necessary to maintain and increase the
proficiency of the work force and thereby improve business operations, the tests and
requirements become job related. Without proof of an intent to discriminate, they claimed,
the tests should not be condemned as violative of Title VII. Brief for Appellee, in 28 L. Ed.
2d 925, 926 (1972). The Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that the purpose of
Title VII "was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other
employees." 401 U.S. at 429-30. The Court reasoned that the use of aptitude tests and
educational requirements create arbitrary and artificial barriers to equal employment. Thus,
it was held that the utilization of these criteria would only be sustained upon a showing of
"business necessity." Since the appellee in Griggs failed to prove a demonstrable relationship
between the use of the tests and increased job performance, the tests were invalidated. Id. at
431-32.
215 401 U.S. at 432.261d. For a further analysis of the business necessity test see Note, Business Necessity under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974), and
Note, Employment Discrimination: The Burden is on Business, 31 MD. L. REV. 255 (1971).
27 509 F.2d at 1116 (Mansfield, J., dissenting), quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972). See also United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F.
Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (Fair Housing Act to be given broad construction in
accordance with its purpose).
28 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
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site in a case of statutory interpretation. 29 This argument appears
to have little validity, however, because it relies on a misinterpreta-
tion of Judge Hays' use of James. The majority cites that case for
the narrow proposition that poverty and race are not functionally
equivalent.30 It is unclear why this principle should be any less true
in a case construing a congressional statute.
In James, the Supreme Court appears to have rejected the
contention that race and low income are functionally equivalent.
There, plaintiffs challenged, as a violation of equal protection, an
article of the California constitution which provided that no low-
rent public housing project could be constructed without prior
approval by a majority of the community in a mandatory referen-
dum. 3 1 When a state creates classifications based on race, courts will
strictly scrutinize the state's actions to determine if there is a com-
pelling state interest justifying the disparate treatment. 32 Although
distinctions drawn on wealth are traditionally disfavored, 33 justifica-
tion for such a grouping demands only that the state demonstrate a
rational basis for the distinction. 34 Thus, when in James the Su-
29 509 F.2d at 1116 (Mansfield, J., dissenting). Judge Mansfield argued that the princi-
ples applied in Janies are totally different from those applicable to a case interpreting a
congressional statute. The James Court, he noted, was not concerned with statutory interpre-
tation, but with the constitutionality of a presumptively valid state statute. Id. at 1116-17.
30Id. at 1112.
" 402 U.S. at 139 n.2.
12 If a case is one involving a "suspect classification," viz, one based on race, alienage, or
lineage, courts will strictly scrutinize the state's action, imposing a far heavier burden of
justification than they require for classifications based on other factors. See, e.g., Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971) (state statute denying aliens welfare benefits
scrutinized by "heightened judicial solicitude"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)
(state action creating racial classifications constitutionally suspect); Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (federal government's internment of persons of Japanese
descent subject to the "most rigid scrutiny"). For detailed discussions of the impact of James
v. Valtierra on the equal protection clause see Comment, California' Low-Income Housing
Referendanm: Equal Protection and the Problem of Economic Discridnation, 8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 135 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Economic Discrimination I, Note, Low-Incomne Housing and
the Equal Protection Clause, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Lon-Income
Housing], and 40 FORDHA.% L. REV. 379 (1971).
"See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966), where the
Court stated that "[I]ines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race.... are
traditionally disfavored." (citation omitted).
34 Classifications based on wealth alone are insufficient to require application of a strict
scrutiny standard. Instead, the state need only demonstrate a rational relationship between
the classification and the objective sought. Wealth classifications receive strict scrutiny only
when a fundamental right is inextricably intertwined with the classification. For discussions
of the treatment of wealth classifications under the equal protection clause, see 40 FORDAMI
L. REV. 379, 380-81 (1971), Econonic Discrimination, supra note 32, at 141-45, and Loul-Income
Housing, supra note 32, at 344-45. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right
to travel involved with wealth classification); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(fundamental right to appeal criminal conviction affected by a wealth classification).
Housing has yet to be expressly recognized as a fundamental right although several
decisions had indicated a trend in this direction. In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948),
[Vol. 50:391
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preme Court refused to apply the strict scrutiny standard, it
strongly implied that income alone is not a suspect classification
and will not be equated with classifications based on race.35
Even assuming that the majority's reliance on James is appro-
priate, it is submitted that the dissent's proposed adoption of the
business necessity test would better effectuate the intent and pur-
pose of the housing legislation.36 Notably, the Supreme Court in
Griggs did not find it necessary to equate race with inferior intelli-
gence. Instead, the Court focused primarily on the fact that blacks
performed more poorly than whites on the tests designed to mea-
for example, the Court stated in dictum that the right to acquire, hold, enjoy, and convey
property is among the civil rights protected from discriminatory state action. Id. at 10.
Similarly, the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1969), though
dealing with the thirteenth amendment, stated that "the badges and incidents of slavery...
included restraints upon 'those fundamental rights which are the essence of civil freedom,
namely, the same right.., to inherit, purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens.'" Id. at 441, quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883).
Fundamental rights are not permanently established, but evolve as courts recognize
additional interests as basic to our society. This proposition was implied by the Supreme
Court in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), where the Court stated:
In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discriminatory, we have never
been confined to historic notions of equality, any more than we have restricted due
process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a given time deemed to be the limits of
fundamental rights.... Notions of what constitutes equal treatment for purposes of
the Equal Protection Clause do change.
Id. at 669 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
• 5 402 U.S. at 141. The James Court said that the constitutional provision in question
requires "referendum approval for any low-rent public housing project, not only for projects
which will be occupied by a racial minority." Id.
:1 Other than to say that the Griggs test has never been applied in a Fair Housing Act
case, 509 F.2d at 1114, the Boyd majority made little attempt to rebut the proposal that
utilization of the business necessity test would more effectively foster the spirit of the
housing legislation. In support of its view regarding application of the Griggs test, the
majority cited Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 n.19 (1972). 509 F.2d at 1114.
Jefferson, however, dealt with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d et
seq. (1970), which proscribes discrimination in federally financed projects. The Jefferson
Court did not say that Griggs was inapplicable. Instead, it based its decision on a finding that
the classification disproportionately affecting blacks and Mexicans was rationally related to
the purposes of the welfare program in dispute. 406 U.S. at 549 n.19.
While no court has expressly applied the business necessity test to Fair Housing Act
cases, at least one circuit court may be said to have effectively adopted this approach. In
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 828 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974),
citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Eighth Circuit stated that
defendant's procedure, "even though neutral on its face, cannot stand if it in its operation
serves to discriminate on the basis of race." Moreover, the court said that "[w]hen a plaintiff
makes a prima facie case of discrimination . . . the burden shifts to the defendant to
articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection." 499 F.2d at
827. See also United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 936 (1974) (effect of defendant's acts of significance while intention only of minor
importance); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908, 910 (10th Cir. 1973) (defendant successfully
disproved inference of discrimination after prima facie case established); United States v.
Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973), affd in part & remanded hi part per
urianl, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975) (presence of good faith alone not sufficient to destroy
prima facie inference of discrimination against defendant); Newbern v. Lake Lorelei, Inc.,
308 F. Supp. 407, 417 (S.D. Ohio 1968) (prima facie inference of discrimination is determi-
native when defendant offers no explanation).
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sure general intelligence.17 Because the tests had the objective
result of excluding a disproportionate number of blacks from job
opportunities, the employer was required to show that the tests
were related to measuring job capacity.3 Moreover, it was not
necessary for the plaintiff in Griggs to prove that the employer's use
of the tests was prompted by an improper motive. As that Court
observed, "Congress directed the thrust of [Tide VII] to the conse-
quences of employment practices, not simply the motivation."3 9 The
circumstances in Boyd parallel those in Griggs in that Lefrak's
economic standards result in the exclusion of a high proportion of
minorities. In addition, the Fair Housing Act, like Title VII, is
designed to remove the effects of racial and other types of dis-
crimination. 40 An objective showing of discrimination should there-
fore be sufficient to establish a prima facie case and shift to the
defendant the burden of coming forward.
The decision in Boyd appears to strangle effective implementa-
tion of the Fair Housing Act. To establish racial discrimination in a
private housing case when a defendant is not overtly using one of
the statutorily condemned criteria to discriminate, the plaintiff will
be faced with the arduous, if not impossible, task of proving that
the defendant's subjective intent is to discriminate. 41 Unless the
defendant publicly divulges his discriminatory purpose- a totally
unrealistic expectation - any cause of action of this nature would
be futile.
By adopting Judge Mansfield's approach courts would not be
forced to search the subconscious motives of a defendant to find a
discriminatory intent, but could look to the end result of the de-
fendant's acts. Under such an objective test, to make out a prima
facie case, a plaintiff must establish only that the use of the defen-
dant's criteria, be they personal, social, or economic in nature, has a
'7 The Griggs Court did discuss the fact that blacks in the South generally received
inferior education. 401 U.S. at 430. This was not, however, essential to the Court's holding.38 1d. at 436.
391d. at 432.
'0 See notes 3 & 23 supra.
41 The Second Circuit, in discussing when economic criteria would be violative of the
Fair Housing Act, stated:
A businessman's differential treatment of different economic groups is not neces-
sarily racial discrimination and is not made so because minorities are statistically
overrepresented in the poorer economic groups. . . . In order to utilize this
correlation to establish a violation of the Fair Housing Act on the part of a private
landlord, plaintiffs would have to show that there existed some demonstrable
prejudicial treatment of minorities over and above that which is the inevitable result
of disparity in income.
509 F.2d at 1113.
[Vol. 50:391
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disproportionate effect on minority groups.42 The burden of going
forward would then shift to the defendant to prove a nondis-
criminatory justification for his acts. 43 This procedure requires the
court to look only to the results brought about by employment of
the defendant's standards. It does not, as the majority suggests,
require the judiciary to equate race with income.
The approach of looking to the effect of a facially neutral
practice has recently been utilized by the Second Circuit in the area
of school segregation. In Hart v. Community School Board,44 the court
held that racial motivation is not necessary to establish unlawful de
jure segregation. Rather, when a school board's actions or inactions
have the foreseeable consequence of fostering segregation, de jure
segregation may be found.45 It may be argued that Boyd and Hart
are distinguishable in that Hart involved state action while Boyd
dealt only with private conduct allegedly in violation of federal
statutes. The Eighth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits,46 however, have
42 For discussions of the benefits which can be derived from use of the objective test in
housing cases, see Bogen & Falcon, The Use of RacialStatistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 MD.
L. REV. 59 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Racial Statistics], and Comment, James v. Valtierra:
Housing Discrimnation by Referendum?, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 115, 135 (1971).
43 As the dissent in Boyd stated:
[I]t should be sufficient to show that the challenged practice excludes a dispropor-
tionately high percentage of minority persons as compared with non-minority. The
burden of going forward with a non-racial justification should then shift to the
person using the practice.
509 F.2d at 1116 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
There are several methods suggested for implementing this objective approach in
housing actions. Among the most common are the use of statistics and "testers." Utilizing
statistics to show that a landlord had actively kept minorities out of his apartments is
probably the easiest method. Here, for example, if a plaintiff shows that out of 15,000
apartments only 2% were rented to blacks, a prima facie inference of discrimination would
arise. For an analysis of the advantages of the use of statistics, see Racial Statistics, supra note
42, at 70-80. See also United States v. Reddoch, 467 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1972). A second
procedure would require plaintiff to show that after he was rejected, white "testers" applied
and received the apartment sought. It would then be the defendant's burden to prove he did
not discriminate on a statutorily condemned basis. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908,
909-10 (10th Cir. 1973).
44 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
45 In Hart, local zoning pattern changes and the addition of new schools had the effect
of removing white students from one junior high school to several others, thereby causing a
segregative result. The court also found that the school board's inaction was a contributing
factor. The Second Circuit stated that a finding of de jure segregation may be based upon
acts or omissions of governmental authorities which have school segregation as their natural
and foreseeable consequence. The court recognized that in a state action context, racial
motivation is too hard to prove and therefore prima facie intent should be presumed from
objective facts. Under a fourtenth amendment equal protection claim, the Second Circuit
stated, "the nature of the 'state action' takes its quality from its foreseeable effect." Id. at 50.
46 Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974);
United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936
(1974); Hamilton v. Miller, 477 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1973).
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit now appears to be leaning towards the dissent's
position in Boyd. See Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 334-39 (7th Cir.), cert.
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concluded that even in Fair Housing Act cases courts should look
to the end result of the disputed practice rather than search for the
defendant's subjective intent. The Fourth Circuit, 47 on the other
hand, has agreed with the view espoused by the Boyd majority,
holding that absent evidence of a discriminatory motive, a lessor
may promulgate any criteria he chooses so long as the practice is
not statutorily condemned. 4
The civil rights statutes are remedial in nature and as such
deserve to be given a broad and generous construction.49 Although
the actual result in Boy'd, at least insofar as the particular facts there
involved, is probably of little consequence, ° the court's position on
the procedure to be followed in fair housing cases is of great
significance. Since proving a racially discriminatory motive is most
often impossible, the Second Circuit's decision will hinder the obvi-
ous intent of Congress to prevent discrimination in private hous-
ing. Had the Second Circuit adopted the business necessity stan-
dard effectively utilized in the employment area,"1 the lessor or
vendor would at least be put to the test of justifying his practices.
This procedure would act to chill the efforts of lessors or vendors
who attempt to implement covert discriminatory practices, thereby
promoting the goals of both the Fair' Housing Act and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866.
Jonathan Oster
denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974). In Clark, an action brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
the court stated that where: (1) the plaintiffs introduce statistical evidence and expert
testimony to show that there exists a dual housing market which is the result of racial
segregation in housing; (2) there is an unreasonable price differential between houses
offered by defendants to blacks as compared with similar housing offered to whites; and, (3)
there is a difference in the sale terms of comparable homes to blacks even though the
economic status of the blacks is equivalent to that of the whites, a prima facie case is
established. The burden, according to the court, would then shift to the defendant to
demonstrate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.
11 Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114, 116-17 (4th Cir. 1974). The plaintiff in this case
sought to buy land from the defendant. Defendant, unaware that the plaintiff was black,
withdrew the land in question from the market for tax reasons. Plaintiff believed that the
defendant would not sell the land because of the plaintiff's race and therefore commenced
an action alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
court refused to apply the objective standard of liability.
4 Id. at 117, quoting Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg., 463 F.2d
1055, 1056 (7th Cir. 1972).4 
'E.g., Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324, 333 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1070 (1974) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); United States v. Real Estate Dev. Corp., 347 F.
Supp. 776, 781 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (Fair Housing Act).
" The standards used by Lefrak were established after consultation with the Govern-
ment in conjunction with the original consent decree. See note 5 supra. Although this factor is
not controlling, it would seem to deserve great weight in determining the validity of
defendants' criteria. In addition, the majority and dissent disagreed on whether the statistical
analysis of the effect of the 90% rule actually showed a disproportionate exclusion of blacks.
See generally Note, Business Necessity under Title VI1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A
No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974); Note, Employment Discrimination: The Burden is
on Business, 31 MD. L. REv. 255 (1971).
